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A synopsis of Hurricane Katrina and the catastrophic damage it caused for the city of New 
Orleans. The number concern for the city of New Orleans is “reconstruction.” This paper is an 
examination of the reconstruction efforts and the government’s priorities after the devastating 
damage created from the cities levee system that was inadequate in function to sustain a storm of 
Hurricane Katrina’s magnitude. Research, reports, interviews and first-hand accounts create an 
interesting analysis of the reconstruction efforts. This report will challenge the ideas of 
bureaucracy, oligarchy, and the theories of ethnic cleansing practices, resulting in the current 
status of New Orleans reconstruction and reformation within the “Big Easy.” 
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Introduction 
 
New Orleans: A City under Reconstruction 
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the many different effects of hurricane Katrina on the 
City of New Orleans and the rest of the world. The great city of New Orleans dealt with a natural 
disaster with little state or federal support until days into the crisis. Many high ranking officials 
were well aware of the threat that a storm of Katrina’s magnitude could pose for a city with 
levees. In addition, prior to hurricane Katrina, New Orleans was overdue for an overhaul of its 
law, government, and education systems. There were thousands of families within the city 
unprepared for a storm that could destroy their entire livelihood. The recovery efforts as of this 
date have been slow and ineffective. 
Research on this paper brought many different areas of concern to the surface. One question 
should be asked in a blunt phrase. Who has to gain from the city and its new plans for 
reconstruction? Many evacuees were those of lower income status; they were relocated to many 
other cities and states outside of the disaster areas. Residents who were able to evacuate did so 
not knowing whether they were going to have anything left when they returned. Upon returning 
many New Orleans citizens are choosing to leave the city all together and start a new life 
elsewhere. Their exit has not been met with much resistance. High crime, rent increases and 
elevated insurance premiums have resulted in many new orleanians leaving the city they loved 
behind. (Shaila Dewan 2007: 1A)  Although many of these issues were known prior to Katrina, 
they have now exceeded the tolerance level of many New Orleans residents.  
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The Aftermath 
  Many well educated and middle class New Orleans residents are now faced with the hard 
choice of remaining under tragic and destitute conditions or leaving and starting “anew” else 
where. The city cannot withstand a complete loss of educated and middle class residents who 
along with their assets could contribute to the well being of the city. According to the American 
Red Cross, Hurricane Katrina alone destroyed an estimated 275,000 housing units. House 
Resolution 4100 was a bill sponsored by Representative Richard Baker of Louisiana’s 6th 
District. (The Louisiana Recovery ACT 2005) This bill favors property owners who face 
hardships due to Katrina and its resulting damage. Therefore, the program benefits owners who 
have their property purchased by LRC (Louisiana Recovery Corporation) up to $500,000 dollars 
with options on how to rebuild. Now keep in mind that the funds used to purchase properties 
from the owners are from bonds issued from the State Treasury department. The property would 
then be auctioned off to private developers only after infrastructure repairs are made. The 
proceeds would allow the bonds to be repaid.  
The Greater Population of New Orleans 
The greater population of New Orleans is made up of lower income subsidy - eligible 
citizens, many of whom were displaced after Katrina. Within these masses were also 
homeowners who lived from paycheck to paycheck with the required minimal housing 
insurance. They ask now, “What has Louisiana offered us in regards to our homes and repairs?” 
The 4100 bill has yet to offer options of repair and mortgage forgiveness to these citizens. This is 
because The Federal Road Home program has yet to provide relief for many neighborhoods in 
need of repair. On Thursday June 14th 2007, many New Orleans-area residents marched from the 
Governor’s Mansion to the State Capitol. (Gyan 2007: 19A) Resident and marcher Francine 
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Lamonthe stated she has waited since 2005 for assistance from the program designed to help 
many New Orleans residents. Lamonthe says she was offered $30,000 to elevate her home and 
that was not enough to make the necessary repairs. The marchers are questioning the facts 
regarding the $5 billion Road Home shortfall. “They said at first they had enough to cover 
everybody. What happened to that money?’’ Lamonthe asked. Francine Lamonthe has been 
away from her home for 21 months following Katrina and has to commute from Baton Rouge, 
where she resides with relatives. The mayor of New Orleans Ray Nagin and many other city 
officials marched with concerned New Orleans citizens and their families.  
The Response 
The Governor of Louisiana, Kathleen Blanco, responded to the citizens concerns with a 
released statement, that $5 billion in state money has gone to recovery since Katrina and 
Hurricane Rita. (Gyan 2007: 19A) She also added that reconstruction in South Louisiana remains 
her top priority. Governor Blanco plans to meet with congress in Washington with plans to ask 
for $714 million on “The Road Home” deficit — a mix of federal recovery dollars and 
reallocated state cash. She will be asking federal officials to fill the remaining gap. The delay 
comes from the department of Federal Emergency Management Agency (Gyan 2007)  
Even so, The New York Times reported that the cost for the road home project will cost well 
over the previous estimated $7.5 billion due to many more families applying than anticipated. 
Louisiana recipients could receive up to $150,000 dollars to repair or rebuild. (Eaton 2007) This 
could possibly mean that Francine Lamonthe as mentioned above may be able to get her appeal 
granted due to a larger amount of funds being allocated for The Road Home project. Not 
surprising the financial problems of the project has lead to several rounds of the “blame game” 
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and finger-pointing. This occurs when an organization fails to hold up its end of responsibility. 
The federal government should and has been well versed in the events of disasters and public 
havoc. Yet, the government failed to develop an effective chain of command.   
Centralizing decision making only works when the people in charge are competent.  
Many federal organizations function at capacity and the main key organizations fail to produce 
effective key resolutions (Westrum 2007: 4).  In order to have been effective, President Bush and 
Governor Blanco needed to stay on top of the renovations funds for New Orleans.   Out of 
140,000 applicants, only 22,000 families have received funds for renovating their homes and 
only expending 1.3 billion out of the total allocated for this purpose (Eaton 2007). There is 
something seriously wrong with this ratio. Top government officials have the power to spend 
fund(s) for their other agendas. Why is New Orleans not there top agenda?  After 9/11 President 
Bush quickly implemented action plans to fund a massive war for search for weapons of mass 
destruction which have never been found.   
Other Responsible Sectors 
 Many private insurance agencies have not honored claims to their insured customers. 
The government expected these insurance agencies to pay for damages incurred by Katrina 
victims. New Orleans citizens paid monthly premiums to there private insurance companies with 
expectation they would be covered in the event a natural and resulting property damage. On the 
other hand, the National Flood Insurance paid out to claimants as promised. Most government 
relief funds for Katrina victims pay only after private insurance companies have paid their share. 
Then they normally pay the difference. Because of this tow years after Katrina costs have 
skyrocketed. Interesting enough, we are back to the blame game and finger-pointing again;  
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President Bush and his administration blame the state of Louisiana for creating the shortfall by 
paying for home damage caused by wind, rather than limiting the program to flood damage. 
Insurance policies are more likely to cover wind damage than flood damage (Eaton 2007). 
Donald E. Powell, President Bush’s coordinator for Gulf Coast rebuilding, stated in an email, 
that he would make good on more funds if the state could provide viable cause! Why would this 
tragedy where this natural disaster caused millions of people to be without homes not occur 
viable? Ironically, responsible leaders in government have dragged their feet. Mr. Powell states, 
that he is willing to settle this matter quickly. Further he indicated his willingness to sit down 
with the Governor of Louisiana to resolve this situation.  
However, FEMA said it cannot release money intended for hazard-mitigation efforts for 
elevating homes.  FEMA blames the Road Home for discriminating against younger citizens by 
exempting people 65 and older from a requirement that grant recipients live in their rebuilt 
houses for three years (Eaton 2007). Moreover some democrat officials for the state of Louisiana 
feel that the responsibility does not lie just with the Federal Government but the state of 
Louisiana as well.   
A group of former insurance adjusters created a case against their former insurance 
agencies filing a “whistleblower” lawsuit stating the practices and conduct of business by the 
insurance companies were inadequate and illegal. The allegations refer to plans of insurance 
companies, shifting payout cost to the tax payer supported flood insurance program, with the 
hopes of lessoning the amount they owe to homeowners. (Eaton, Treaster 2007) Excessive 
insurance rates for home and property insurance, has delayed and discouraged builders from 
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constructing rental housing. This then has caused a huge dilemma for non-profit agencies 
attempting to provide housing for elderly and indigent citizens.    
Levee Reconstruction 
The levees along the Mississippi coast line have already shown vast problems after 
Katrina. The levees were repaired by the Army Corps of Engineers. Robert Bea, a leading critic 
of the corps, investigated the levees and reported the weakest locations are along the Mississippi 
coast. Dr. Bea was asked by National Geographic to evaluate the levees after Katrina and the 
yearlong reconstruction project. The Army Corps Engineers boasted that their most formidable 
project was along the most serious flaws turned up in the rebuilt levees along the Mississippi 
River Gulf Outlet ship channel. This channel broke in more than 20 places when Katrina's storm 
surge pounded it; thus leading to devastating flooding in the Lower Ninth Ward and St. Bernard 
Parish (Bourne, Schwartz 2007: 17A1) . Bea also found areas where large rain storms have 
eroded the rebuilt levees. Without effective levees, New Orleans will surely parish under future 
strong hurricanes. New Orleans seems to have trouble filtering out rain water from the city due 
to the fact the levees have not been renovated in almost a decade. The problem may lie with the 
need to cover the levees with a substantial material such as concrete or something of that nature. 
However the Corps feels they are doing what is best fit for the levees and that a harder material 
will not fix the problem (Bourne, Schwartz 2007: 17A1) 
Nevertheless, there needs to be less bureaucracy and more collaboration among the 
responsible groups to ensure the safety of citizens of New Orleans. Lawsuits and fighting over 
who is to blame will not solve the problem at hand, during such tirades another storm could hit at 
anytime, then what? Again it is up to individuals who hold power to bring together collaborating 
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minds to reconstruct the levees with sufficient collaborative scenarios and plans in place to 
ensure they work properly. Perhaps a more Organic approach to the repair of the levees would 
serve as promising outcome. Each person with power should take the issues directly to 
individuals in charge of the repairs.  
Angels in Action 
Hope is not all diminished… 
 There are many private organizations and well known contributors to the survivors of 
Katrina. In November 2006, Oprah™ Angel Network and Habitat for Humanity® began 
building a fifth “Oprah Katrina Homes” community in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, for families 
impacted by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita (Angel Lane Oprah.com).Oprah's Angel Network 
donated $11 million dollars to Americas Second Harvest to purchase and distribute food, water, 
and household supplies to survivors in Louisiana as well as Mississippi, Alabama, Tennessee and 
Texas. Oprah Winfrey took it upon herself to ensure she placed all available contact numbers and 
organization relief names for individuals who would like to contribute and or contact these 
entities on her website.  For six days post Katrina Oprah called on her staff, friends and 
colleagues to assist with relief efforts. Oprah traveled to Louisiana, Texas, Mississippi and 
Tennessee, she arrived on the coast with convoy trucks loaded with food, water and basic 
necessities. This goes back to the notion of one person taking control, a person whom may not 
hold any real power in government or otherwise, quickly became a bureaucracy of one. She did 
what she knew needed to be done to help the victims of Katrina. As the president of the United 
States flew above the states aboard Air Force One, Oprah and her staff were on the ground 
giving there time love and money to those in dire straits. 
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FEMA did not release desperately needed goods, foods, or sufficient supplies; and often 
this was caused by not having a single routing number and the approval to move forward. The 
USS Bataan, a ship well equipped and prepared to assist the thousands of people in need, was 
turned back, by FEMA’s director Michael Chertoff. Chertoff was un-trained and ill-prepared for 
the events that took place along the gulf coast (Westrum 2007: 4). A bureaucracy that failed in 
many areas. However, in the most of these failures there stood many angels in the light giving 
what they could to the Katrina victims 
After Hurricane Katrina, Oprah asked all her viewers to open their hearts. As of 
September 2006, donations to the Oprah Angel Network Katrina registry total more than $11 
million. Homes have been built in four states—Texas, Mississippi, Louisiana, Alabama—before 
the one year anniversary of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.  (Oprah.com, Philanthropy) Among the 
many great individuals assisting Katrina victims, is a well known physician by the name of Dr. 
Mehmet Oz; also known on the Oprah show as “Dr. Oz”, who omit you will read below, he was 
completely un-prepared for what he encountered in New Orleans. Dr. Oz says, "It's pretty 
desperate here. They're not drinking. They're not eating. A lot of folks are passing out. You can 
smell death in the air. Just feces and excrement and human sweat." He goes on to say; “But if 
you can imagine, the situation on the streets of New Orleans is just as grim.”  "I've walked these 
streets dozens of times; I could never imagine this happening to New Orleans: a dead body in the 
middle of a street," says Dr. Oz. "You'd never think this is possible in an American city. But 
literally all we can do right now is put chairs in front of him so he doesn't get run over by cars. 
Amazing to read, that such an ordeal has occurred right here in an American city (Dr. Oz 2005). 
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Lisa Ling is a reporter who has traveled to many war zones around the world. Yet she felt 
overwhelmed by the chaotic scene she witnessed right here on American soil. In her own words; 
Lisa met many families that told the same horrific stories of their ordeal in the Superdome, the 
very place that was supposed to serve as a safe haven. Shaken by their stories, Lisa felt 
compelled to question the way authorities responded: "If this had happened to an affluent, white 
community, would people have had to wait for five days in a dangerous, dark, disgustingly dirty 
environment, or would something have been done? This is America, that's the thing that is most 
disconcerting about this," says Lisa. (Berkus, Ling 2005) 
Faith Hill and "Tim (McGraw, her husband) knew that we had to do something. They did 
one simple task to begin they contacted the American Red Cross and asked, “What can we do? 
What can we bring?'" She was given a list of specifics that she and Tim quickly placed into 
action. They obtained three semis and their very own personal bus. They began calling close 
friends and family," says Faith. "We were able to do a major attack on the city of Nashville in 
one day and it was just mind-blowing how the community came together," she adds. (Hill, 
McGraw 2005) 
Matthew McConaughey was of many Celebrities there to offer assistance and did so in so 
many ways. Matthew (2005) says that his expectations prior to arriving in New Orleans were not 
that defined". "I knew what I knew from the television. I saw quite a bit of destruction. I didn't 
understand necessarily the scope of it. I'm still trying to digest what I think we're all going to 
have to digest for some time. There's so much work to do. The one thing that is pure about 
helping out with a tragedy like this is service. Share what you have. And that's the best way we 
know." McConaughey (2005) 
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Habitat for Humanity has stepped in and taken responsibility for helping rebuild many 
locations within New Orleans. They are heading a project called the “Musicians Village” a row 
of brightly colored homes mainly to be sold to musicians, musicians whom make Mardi Gras 
what it is musically each year. The site sits on 81 acres that was in the past, an old junior high 
school. Seventy-one homes will be built here and they will sell for $75,000 plus the sweat and 
equity it takes to build them. With the Habitat for Humanity each person qualifying for a home 
has to contribute so many “sweat hours” into the building of there very own home. Seventy to 
eighty percent of these homes will be sold to musicians. The buildings are raised 67 inches off 
the ground due to the high water marks left on other building near by Katrina flooding. Note that 
the 67 inches is two inches higher than the recommended footage the federal Emergency 
Management Agency made effective policy (Pareles 2007). 
A Larger Housing Crisis 
To add to the chaos mentioned in this report, thousands of evacuees since Katrina have 
been living in trailers set up by the government as emergency housing. The government 
announced that evacuees will be offered the chance to purchase these trailers for a few hundred 
dollars. Those whom don’t purchase will have to rent per month at the cost of $50 which will 
soon to increase. The Federal Emergency Management Agency runs the trailer program. It is 
reported that roughly around 86,000 families are still living in the trailers. This is astonishing due 
to the fact Katrina occurred two years ago.  The majority of the trailers reside in Louisiana, 
although about 26,000 families occupy trailers in Mississippi, said R. David Paulison (Eaton 
2007). Eighty percent of those families living in trailers are parked in people’s driveways or 
yards. 
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According to government estimates, hurricanes Katrina and Rita collectively destroyed 
more than 200,000 homes. These estimates include many apartments that, to date, have yet to be 
rebuilt. The state of Louisiana recently announced that it had awarded $202 million in federal 
funds to help small landlords restore more than 5,200 rental units. There is no mention of 
guidelines as to whether these small landlords would take the money for restoration then sell 
there property for higher profit to a non local wealthy developer looking to capitalize off of this 
potential harvest land of wealth.  
One could predict that the problem of few apartments being readily available to rent 
makes way for rental rates to soar along the Gulf Coast. This presents a new problem for the 
already homeless, post Katrina victims of New Orleans unable to afford rental rates; thus they 
are unable to return home. There may be some light at the end of the tunnel for those whom 
thought they would not be able to afford to reside in the home town of New Orleans. April of 
2007 FEMA turned over controlling reigns to the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development. They will now head the rental assistance program. HUD has long standing 
expertise in running long term housing. Why FEMA was given this task In the first place, is still 
to be answered. 
The community organized group Acorn, sued the federal government because of the 
manner in which it handled post-hurricane housing programs. Acorn praised the extension on 
housing and the program’s shift to HUD. The housing department now has the task of finding 
adequate housing for the families not able to purchase the trailers and for those whom would like 
to not live in such a cramped reminder of the disaster. For a family to go from a single family 
home to a trailer can be mentally depressing. To make matters worse there has been a class-
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action lawsuit filed in Baton Rouge federal court that claims “hundreds of thousands” of people 
in Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabama may have been exposed to the carcinogen Formaldehyde. 
Named as defendants are Forest River Inc. and “other, as yet unnamed travel trailer vendors to 
the Federal Emergency Management Agency.” (Brown 2007) 
Allegations are that many families have been exposed to dangerously high concentrations 
of formaldehyde fumes; but, they have no choice but to accept their horrible situation. The 
trailers in question are the 120,000 temporary trailers FEMA supplied to those displaced by the 
2005 storm. The Sierra Club conducted indoor air quality testing of 34 trailers in Louisiana and 
Mississippi and all but two had aerial formaldehyde levels above those considered safe. 
Formaldehyde is used in a number of materials inside the trailers, including particle board, 
plywood, glue, curtains, molded plastic and countertops. As of May 2007, FEMA had received 
140 formaldehyde complaints (Eaton 2007). With the onset of these allegations as well as the 
lawsuit filed, FEMA and HUD have distributed information on proper trailer ventilation to 
occupants. Fifty trailer units have been replaced to date.  FEMA says they will no longer 
purchase trailers containing materials made with the carcinogen Formaldehyde. 
New Orleans Police Department 
New Orleans has several police stations operating out of temporary trailers. Officers are 
working out of trailers for an evidence room housed in the back of an 18-wheeler truck, and a 
makeshift crime lab set up at a nearby university. Senator Mary Landrieu, D-La., and Sen. David 
Vitter, R-La., met before a congressional panel to discuss the rising crime waves post Katrina. 
The city of New Orleans has not fully regained control of crime. The police stations and the city 
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jail facilities that were destroyed during Katrina have yet to be rebuilt. The violence taking over 
the city has gotten out of hand, argue many officials. 
However without the adequate means to function properly, NOPD argues they have a 
slim to zero chance of fighting crime and housing criminals. Criminals are well aware of the 
city’s crippling position. Only four out of the 11 jails serving the city have reopened, says 
Committee Chairman Patrick Leahy, D-Conn “The COPS program has been cut to send police 
money to Baghdad,” Leahy said. (Shields 2007:16A)Despite numerous criminal activities 
throughout the city, the issue remains that there needs to be adequate buildings and facilities 
available to effectively carry out police functions. It is not a shock that the state of Louisiana has 
moved very slow in regards to housing for its citizens, but it’s equally troubling the length of 
time it’s taking for municipal departments to have adequate facilities.  
The New Orleans Police department has suffered dramatic moral issues prior to Katrina 
and has been aggravated by the lower budget since Katrina. Many would agree that New Orleans 
has always been affected negatively, by political influence, dating back to early 18-1900’s. If the 
city could get its buildings projects functioning properly, morale could probably be raised 
amongst police officials. Through the hurricane Katrina tragedy, this may be what the city needs 
to show the rest of the world that they are not running a corruption government. Without proper 
facilities to house the criminals and suspects, the city has little to no chance of regaining and 
restoring power over crime. What does this mean for the many displaced Katrina victims 
wanting to return to the city of New Orleans? Will these individuals want to return to a broken 
city unable to uphold justice? For those whom want to invest in New Orleans for business 
ventures, will this city be able to provide security? For those residents that were part of the 
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growing criminal problem, are finding it hard to return to the city they once knew as home. As 
many of the cities housing projects are now being torn down and rebuilt to house the middleclass 
with integration of low income residents. The housing projects accounted for more than half of 
the cities crimes. As lower income, low education and a secluded means of living created a 
habitat of despair, many residents had to find any means to survive. It is believed that the efforts 
the city has made so far are those of which to filter out the bad and flood in the good. The city of 
New Orleans is in need of criminal overhaul and justice based legal systems. Before Katrina the 
police of the lower ninth, sixth and third wards would systematically walk the beat in the housing 
projects daily. However, as many of the city’s police departments suffer gravely from depleted 
numbers, they don’t have the man power to run these programs within the ghettos. Previously the 
housing projects of New Orleans housed a great deal of respected and loving residents that cared 
for their community. This fact however does not overshadow the high rate of crime, drug 
activity, and murder(s) to which projects have fallen victim. Before Katrina, it is reported that the 
Lafitte housing project located in the 6th ward succumbed to four murders; four in 2003, seven in 
2004, and one in 2005. (Reckdahl 2006: 6)  
Low Income Housing 
-Project Housing of New Orleans- 
Many of New Orleans housing projects were built over fifty years ago. The section 8 and 
HUD housing programs are well overdue for revision as they have been aggressively 
approaching rebuilding for market-rate and subsidized housing. Creating these new 
neighborhoods are the future priorities of the government and the state of New Orleans. 
Reconstruction plans consist of tearing down existing housing to make way for new 
developments of mixed income housing. The 80% of low income residents that are waiting to 
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return home are opposed to the new idea of reform housing. Is it really possible to place people 
with problems they had prior to Katrina in new housing that is worth more equity than the 
“below median” they were required to pay?. 
New Orleans lower income areas were gravely destroyed by Katrina; these were mostly 
federally zoned sections of entire neighborhoods of subsidized housing. These neighborhoods of 
great poverty were not formed by mutual uniformity but created by deliberate government 
choices that placed poor minorities into less desirable areas of the city. Without question many of 
these families would like to return to there way of life. However the new Section 8 plans are 
geared towards more of self substance and racial diversity amongst neighbors. There are many 
new government and state level plans in action to ensure individuals are equipped to function 
and maintain personal sufficiency, without the government being too much of a reliable crutch 
for those who choose or were products of social construction; not to educate and seek training on 
there own without force from “ill-functional ran” programs. Social Science has shown that 
integrating people amongst those whom have a visual difference and background proves to be 
rewarding and empowering. Research on poverty and housing shows that a high number of poor 
individuals wish to move towards economic opportunity but often are daunted by the search 
process and the emotional disruption of moving.  
Unfortunately the same fate applies to the working poor. The events of Katrina have 
placed the city of New Orleans in a high risk bracket of reconstruction. Insurance agencies are 
protecting their underwriting agreements by charging higher rates for damage and natural 
disaster premiums. As the expense of building rises and the addition of insurance premiums; far 
less affordable housing will be built. This creates an impending problem for the working class 
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citizens who fall below the median to afford market-rate rent. Whether educated or the other, the 
rate of rental properties and housing units has forced an extremely sensitive situation into a 
plethora of new problems. 
Housing placement services assist housing citizens in need of coaching throughout the 
application process. Conspiracy theories postulate that the levees of Louisiana were left as they 
were to eradicate certain areas of the state, to provide a situation of renewed building and a 
higher class of society. It would seem that without the guarantee of a safe environment it’s not 
suitable for anyone. Crime at the rates it’s maintained since Katrina, low income housing overall 
may not stand any chance of getting vouchers for housing within the familiar realms of 
environment provided by the ghettos and housing projects. Discernibly, only eleven percent of 
the nation’s public housing agencies are issuing the emergency vouchers for current HUD 
certificate holders; which means many of the families with vouchers prior to Katrina are now 
without Section 8 and not receiving much assistance. According to reports from HUD of the 
5,146 displaced Housing Authority of New Orleans recipients, only about 2,300 have received 
vouchers and further more face the growing problem of finding landlords that will accept the 
vouchers. (Reckdahl 2006: 8) this may be what lower income status families need to prove that 
they too are able to be productive in society without the need for so much of the governmental 
assistance. Although the situation in its entirety may prove to be wayward, look at how the entire 
economy is functioning throughout the United States.  
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A New Project 
Many New Orleans natives are investing in Evacuee homes. This new trend is ensuring 
they will have a safe and secure place to shelter personal belongings ensuring “all” is not lost in 
the event of another hurricane. Katrina has prompted many new orleanians to figure out escape 
routes out of the city, where to park their second vehicles high enough to avoid water damage 
and vandalism. Further they are keeping up with the hurricane seasons and when to best leave. 
The outskirts of New Orleans and the state of Mississippi have become a safe haven for many 
middle class citizens. They have purchased second homes made possible by foreclosed 
properties and lower real-estate rates. Last year developers came up with a plan to build a mini 
New Orleans in Macomb Mississippi.  
The homes are geared towards middle class citizens who want a piece of home while 
waiting out storms in their home town. (Read 2007: 1, 3) It is interesting to note that many of 
New Orleans residents fear another flood, almost as if it is imminent. Rebuilding for New 
Orleans may not be the city’s only problem. Keeping their residents in the city is the new issue. 
Other parts of Louisiana will see a huge rise in real-estate and new neighbors moving into there 
business areas. Although many are looking to only provide a safe haven for future catastrophe, 
New Orleans still has many faithful citizens waiting to come back home to live. 
Neighborhoods Rebuilding: Generative Leadership 
The Broadmoor neighborhood residents have proven they are capable of taking charge, at 
a time when city government has failed. Residents, who formerly resided in the Broadmoor 
neighborhood just west of Downtown, were informed that if a majority did not return within four 
months the area would be razed and its land would be turned into a park. Residents quickly came 
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together and formed their own commission in which they named “The Broadmoor Improvement 
Association”. This Association would include those who returned and were willing to rebuild 
and contribute to New Orleans recovery. Mayor Ray Nagin formed a rebuilding commission to 
ensure the rebuilding of areas damaged by Katrina. However all the plans have numerous rules 
that often hinder progress. The Broadmoor neighborhood has many historical homes and has 
been classified as a historical district. Many of the home(s) were built prior to 1950. As of this 
date only 55 percent of its original residents have moved back in, and new residents are 
purchasing homes there also. We love our neighborhood, says “Latoya Cantrell”, the president of 
the BIA. (Shevroy 2007) The Broadmoor neighborhood presented a rather successful example of 
a generative group-think. New Orleans has a growing number of neighborhoods forming out of 
generative style management from like-minded groups at large. Residents want to move back to 
the areas from which they have grown and raised children in. Forming partnerships with 
universities, private investors and non profit organizations, homes are being rebuilt, gutted and 
raised to levels well suited for future storms, natural disasters and longevity.  
Making the New Concept Work 
Post Katrina the lower ninth ward suffered grave damages in large numbers. Ironically 
other areas of New Orleans, also endured great damage to personal owned and city owned 
property these properties are now being re-zoned for demolition and total reconstruction. To date 
all reconstruction areas of New Orleans are focused on a new Neo- New Orleans. A great deal of 
the city run housing projects are scheduled for reconstruction or total demolition. More over 
these sites will be the new locations of city parks and new housing complexes. The new housing 
plans are geared toward the middleclass with an attempt to integrate New Orleans large number 
of working and non working poor. This plan will filter the six main housing projects that are to 
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date closed to its residents. Within this mix of citizens are the senior citizens and disabled who 
survive on fixed incomes. The Fair Market Rent report, released recently by HUD states that the 
average rent in the eighth parish of New Orleans metro area has risen 45 percent post Katrina. 
Prior to hurricane Katrina, rent rates for a two bedroom apartment went for about $676, now the 
rent for the same size unit is $978 and a three bedroom unit is now a whopping $1,256. (NHLS- 
FMRR 2007) with rent prices steadily moving upward many residents cannot afford to return to 
New Orleans. The individuals and families that can manage the new market rates will want to 
live in a stable environment free from constant crime and poverty. Despite opposition HUD will 
continue with plans to demolish and redevelop four of the largest housing projects, demolishing 
about 3,000 apartments that were occupied by low income residents prior to Katrina. The new 
Housing complexes will provide market rate units and about 1,000 low income subsidized units. 
(Dewan 2007: 4) 
HUD and the Family Housing Authority of New Orleans have functioned on outdated 
material that in most cases goes as far as back 40-50 years ago, when the housing projects were 
first built. HUD realizes the complex needs of residents and the city’s citizens that are hard to 
place in what they are hoping to create as “main stream society”. HUD has looked at the Chicago 
public housing family study named the HUD HOPE IV; this program effectively housed lower 
income residents within the middle class sanctum and it worked for many of its residents. The 
housing complexes consist of market –rate units and subsidized units. Those hard to place where 
the disabled mentally ill, and those with criminal records. (Reckdahl 2006)  
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What is the HOPE IV project? 
It was a program developed as a result of recommendations made by the National 
Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing, which was implemented to 
propose a National Action Plan to eradicate severely distressed public housing. 
(HOPE IV Public and Indian Housing) 
The Rhizome Factor 
Generally what is happening; after Katrina the city’s project housing that was home to 
some 900-2,000 residents each, were fenced up and closed down. With all the projects residents 
living in neighboring states or with relatives and friends within the city are now permanently 
displaced. Construction on many of the new planned middle class housing has taken a route of 
slow and long winded progress. Low income, co-dependant residents are left with the notion of 
patience, and hope that they will be able to afford the new housing units. Expressed most firmly, 
within the written interviews of various former housing project residents, was the feeling that 
they are being wronged and would like to maintain life as it was prior to Katrina; the life they 
knew as – “life in the ghetto”. Their need of family orientation seems to be the popular concern. 
The housing projects have created a situation of extreme social dependency. Confronted with 
retention, change is not readily accepted by many of New Orleans poor that are relocated to 
temporary living environments that are very uncomfortable. Sooner rather than later the housing 
projects were going to need a complete overhaul and restructuring. Providing the same type of 
relentless environment within a society, inevitably will lead to the dependence and the need for 
poverty level living. Outdated structures of the New Orleans housing projects segregated the 
middle class from the lower class social sector. Education, shopping, medical resources, 
community and local based centers were that of a lower quality to the residents of project 
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housing. Theoretically, becoming a product of the environments stems from many factors that 
need immediate attention. The city of New Orleans has to make a conscious effort to ensure the 
cycle of dependency generates one of self sufficiency.  
Although many of New Orleans residents are not in favor of relocating to new 
neighborhoods they will have to adjust to the new housing plans. Recipients of HUD vouchers 
and city housing are being forced to except and adjust. If they fail to face this reality, many will 
be left behind within a society determined to move forward. President Bush was quoted as 
saying, “we want evacuees to come home, for the best of reason- because they have a real chance 
at a better life in a place they love.” (Dewan 2007: 1A) This then suggests there is a plan to 
revamp New Orleans for the better, forcing people to make decisions about their lives. The 
government assisted programs are only going to go so far with assisting individuals with 
assistance.  
Hurricane Katrina proved that the government will no longer make way for city funded 
housing projects to linger within the back drop of society. With the new plans underway and 
many of the housing projects cited for demolition, the government has to be concerned with the 
hypothetical question, of whether potential middleclass occupants will seek housing with 
subsidized residents? With this question there has to be an effect efficient means by which to 
systematically incorporate indigent citizens into mainstream society. 
The year of electoral change is forth coming, the state of Louisiana will be electing a new 
governor and amid this election, America collectively will vote for a new president. Voters have 
a great duty to ensure the prospective leaders will produce strong leadership and regard the state 
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of events Katrina to the reconstruction and rehabilitation of reform; will be that of substantial 
effective quality. 
Future Metamorphosis 
A large population of today’s society believe they will die as poor as the day they came 
into this world, which is a sad perspective, you become what you believe, and you are only what 
you perceive yourself to be. This Rhizome way of thinking stems from several factors: This 
tangled web of roots that creates a network of cause and effect. The responsible parties held 
accountable and in high regard for the well being of citizens, are the controlling cells manning 
the web of roots. An underground growth of networks designed to keep those in power with the 
power. Decisions made by these controlling cells, affects the web of roots and stems creating a 
situation that at times, hard to determine a realistic and beneficial solution.  
The initial implementation of project housing was meant to assist the immigrants, blacks 
of the south and north during a time when segregation was under social construction. These 
housing complexes were seen as somewhat beneficial for the time. Although many would argue 
the housing projects were simply built for means of “racial cleansing”. They ensured that the 
immigrants and blacks of non Creole and Cajun decent were placed in an area hidden from main 
stream society and forced to create their own sense of community. However, over time the 
housing projects were not updated and the controlling bodies (the state and government) failed to 
update the management process to fit the evolution of future social needs. Such as; population 
increases, education progress, employment, government assistance etc. In short, the housing 
projects should have become a means of assistance for the short term, not one of long term 
dependence. Several opportunity’s and basic facilities such as education and healthcare facilities 
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have been delegated to the poor by government(s) that place lower standards on care and 
education levels. This also applies to the local grocer and corner liquor stores. Fresh fruit and 
fresh meat of high quality is not held at the highest concern. To provide an off brand or knock off 
cheap brand of food rations is best suited for the poor. This can be proven by simply going to a 
neighborhood you know is occupied with low income residents and walk into their local grocer. 
Drive up the street to the neighborhood corner liquor store, what will you find inside? Providing 
the higher level of facilities into these new reconstructed neighborhoods will be made possible 
by way of middle class tax payers and the low income tax contributing to the wealth of the 
community. The future perspective of the government’s officials is to make sure that the low 
income and underprivileged citizens prior to Katrina grow from the past and succeed in society.  
Education: A Social Construct 
 Education seems to be the main missing link within New Orleans social structure. Most 
low income residents don’t have an education further than the ninth grade. This is startling and 
an insult to our society, to allow individuals to not partake in the requirement to gain an 
education. The state of New Orleans should be held accountable for this unfortunate mishap.  
Laws and programs should be put in place immediately for education levels of at least that of a 
high school diploma.  
Without education you cannot function and evolve within the economy. Majority of the 
New Orleans population are at the poverty level. Majority of the poverished residents are not 
educated. Social segregation motivated my prejudice, cripples the society on a whole. If there is 
a need for reform of the welfare system and HUD programs, educating the poverished population 
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is the first stage of economic recovery. Poverty has its ripple affects; moreover, if you are not the 
person experiencing poverty directly, in some way or another it will have and indirect affect.  
Most importantly, the State of Louisiana must recognize its responsibility regarding this 
unfortunate equation. Society is built on a structure that places leaders in roles of command and 
decision making, for the well being of social progression. Within the social “superstructure” of a 
society, citizens have to independently take ownership of their place within society. When faced 
with the inevitable reality of evolution and change society has to be prepared and pro-active in 
participation or progression. Charles Darwin believed heavily in the evolution of man as a 
species. His views on survival are presenting visible signs in the wake of Katrina, and more so 
within the present state of our countries economy. For generations we have witnessed vast parts 
of society falling behind and in between the cracks of social change. Hurricane Katrina not only 
nearly wiped out areas of New Orleans, but it also introduced the world to witness mankind and 
its ability to survive. —“Survival of the fittest” will be a main theme for the entire state of 
Louisiana. 
The low income citizens of New Orleans have experienced great hardship since Katrina, 
since they are without adequate education to prepare and provide suitable employment for at 
least a middle class level. This is not insinuating that the middle working class new orleanians 
did not face hardship post Katrina, but many owned homes or had jobs to relocate, money saved, 
insurance, and an education to insure them employment in the wake of permanent relocation out 
side of New Orleans. Again the Rhizome effect takes shape in full perspective.   Several civil 
rights activists predict definition through action depicts an example of “ethnic cleansing”. 
Although all class sectors of citizens through New Orleans are enduring similar hardship 
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regarding housing; the individuals with the least amount of education has been the model citizens 
of effective removal. 
An example of – not knowing anything other than what you have grown accustomed, to 
that of the Iberville Housing Project(s) residents. The Iberville was slated for redevelopment 
prior to Katrina. After the hurricane, residents were locked out and un-able to return. (Lydersen 
2007) Although some residents were recently permitted to return, the inevitable reality and fact 
of near future relocation appears non-motivating to its residents. The co-dependency on returning 
to the housing project in its below-poverty, standards of living caused this trapped scenario. In 
other words, the residents of the Iberville focused only upon returning to their way of life and 
living conditions no matter the poverished situation. Social isolation has caused family values 
and norms to be placed at a level that one can only experience once they have been introduced 
and then practiced. 
Multi-Family Affordable Housing 
Searching for adequate housing has proven to be a large problem for several New Orleans 
residents. Although Katrina occurred two years ago, residents of New Orleans have yet to locate 
housing that will accept working families with low wages. A major factor concerning mutli-
family housing inherently creates the need to provide safe and stable environments to New 
Orleans citizens. Distinctively, multifamily housing complexes have constructed units varying in 
numbers. Any one complex could house up to 136-180 families. Dubiously, the term “multi-
family,” substantiates, housing for low income families/individuals; occupant size one-two 
would have an income cap of $27,000; occupant size up to three would have an income cap 
around $30,360. The housing complex, The Crossing formulated these income figures based 
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upon the states median for low income housing guidelines.(Anderson 2007) Ideally the 
discernible plan is to provide housing for the working class. New Orleans has presented a 
housing reconstruction system that will move its residents into an economically driven society. 
The past retention of housing projects and “ghettos,” are nothing more than an economic 
throwback within New Orleans history. Rent for a one-bedroom at The Crossing cost about $546 
a month. Although the rental rates are approximately ten to fifteen percent below the market rate 
(Anderson 2007), overtly, the residents of New Orleans must provide a stable employment 
position to accommodate the rental rates.   
Walnut Square apartments are an example of complete inhalation due to the damage of 
Katrina. Walnut Square was torn down in 2005, and there are plans to rebuild the complex 
designed to accommodate 209 mixed-income families. Formerly the apartments were a series of 
concrete slabs, worn and defrayed by the changes of time. (Gyan 2007: 14A) The National 
Housing Partnership Foundation, of Washington D.C.; a non-profit, owns the Walnut Square. 
Ideally the foundation wishes to make the new Walnut Square housing complex, one that will 
serve as a model for future affordable multifamily housing communities. (Gyan 2007: 14A) 
Walnut Square would include 12 acres. This will facilitate 16 buildings of housing units, 
administrative offices, a five-thousand square foot community center, two playgrounds, walking 
trails, and one acre reserved for commercial space. (Gyan 2007: 14A) In reflection of similar 
affordable housing communities, Walnut Square will also accommodate mixed- income residents 
with an unrestricted income guideline. Monthly rent computations will vary dependant upon 
family size and income compared to the New Orleans area median of $52,200 for a family size 
of four. In addition, twenty five units will postulate floor plans accommodating tenants with 
wheelchairs and another sixteen units designed for the hearing impaired. (Gyan 2007: 14A) The 
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NHP Foundation reports about seventy three percent of affordable housing for low income 
residents, prior to Katrina, were located in and around New Orleans and the Gulf Coast. 
Objectively, the NHP Foundation plans to create three thousand housing communities that 
present an effective quality. (Gyan 2007: 14A) 
The Need for Social Evolution in the Wake of Tyranny 
The revocation and banning of New Orleans low income evacuees by at least five 
parishes in Louisiana and Mississippi presents a true level of segregation and racial prejudice. 
Although these counties have small numbers of blacks living amongst the whites, the urgency to 
keep the 80 percent of New Orleans black low income population out of there parish(s) is most 
important and held at high value. Whites in these parish(s) overtly remain within the 1950’s way 
of life as the towns are mostly run as such, with sheriffs and deputy’s holding true to their 
beliefs. The internet and many highly syndicated news reporting posts produce numerous articles 
of quotes stated by parish leaders and residents, all voicing they would like to see New Orleans 
as a separate city altogether, leaving other parish’s out of the equation in dealing with the 
housing problems.  
Counties of Louisiana wanting evacuees to leave the parish(s) or not permitting evacuees to   
enter — 
• St. Bernard – Louisiana 
• St. John the Baptist – Louisiana 
• Jefferson – Louisiana 
• Pascagoula – Mississippi 
• Ocean Springs - Mississippi 
The daunting process for many evacuees to relocate for the long term or momentarily have 
become vague. The evictions of the permits and vouchers have been under legal scrutiny by 
many civil rights groups. Joseph D Rich, project director for fair housing and community 
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development says, “High levels of crime within the trailer parks have prompted extra security 
provided by FEMA”. He believes that there are racially motivated reasons for not allowing the 
permits to be renewed there is a lot of concern that black and low-income people will be coming 
into there neighborhoods. (Dewan 2007: Frontpage) 
These actions all play a role in the whole overtone of what is happening to the 
restructuring of New Orleans. Society has to evolve to a higher level in order to have a humane 
culture and civilization. Prejudice and personal convictions should be placed aside for the 
security and well being of all. New Orleans is a city of the south that has become unusually 
segregated. Majority of its white middle class has moved north, across Lake Pontchartrain or 
west to Jefferson Parish. (Marsh 2005: 1, 4) Of course there are a few remaining parish’s and 
towns that would like to remain the way they have for centuries back, segregated, prejudiced and 
white. Some local jurisdictions and parishes are fighting to prevent the reconstruction and repair 
of rental units that were occupied pre Katrina. Jefferson Parish, a suburb west of New Orleans, 
blocked a 200 unit complex for the elderly in Terrytown; they claimed it would increase crime in 
their town. The county has also placed a moratorium on a multifamily building. (Dewan 2007) 
Chris Roberts, a Jefferson county councilman, complains that such residents are often idle and 
don’t want to work. He says; “you have some people that just lack any degree of civilization, I 
think low-income housing which is not properly run invites those people.” These views are not 
limited to just one individual; the infamous David Duke a Klansman, resides in the Jefferson 
parish. Duke ran for governor back in 1991, and won more than half of the states white vote. 
(Marsh 2005: 1, 4) Unfortunately many of New Orleans white middle class residents feel as he 
does. The manner in which low income housing has been handled in the past 30 years, has not 
shown much progress, it would be hard to dispute what some feel in regards to the low income 
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projects and housing voucher recipients, although there are many families that work and live 
from pay check to paycheck. However you have the vast majority within many projects and 
neighborhoods that become a product of the environment they have grown accustomed to. Such 
would be the case for those who grow up in blighted homes, they most likely will be the same 
once adults an have families of there own. The cycle of norms and family values plays a huge 
role that in turn shape peoples lives.  
Katrina Related Crime 
 The city of Houston Texas reports the crime rate within the city rose after Katrina 
evacuees sought refuge and temporary solitude. The New York Times reports, during September 
of 2006, there were sixty one reported homicides linked to evacuees; the victims in twenty four 
cases, the suspects in twenty two, and fifteen cases of which one evacuee was accused of killing 
an individual. (The Associated Press NYT 2007)  Houston police reported twenty five Katrina 
related homicides this year alone. The increase of crime prompted resentment towards the 
evacuees. (The Associated Press NYT 2007) 
 It is estimated that approximately a hundred thousand evacuees remain living throughout 
the Houston area. Total record calculations of homicides within Houston through September of 
2007, were two hundred and forty eight; a decline from the two hundred and seventy nine 
homicides reported the previous year, police chief Harold stated. City agencies working with the 
evacuee’s state, the reduction of homicide rates are due to a decrease of evacuees residing in 
apartment complexes, where the majority of the violent crimes were committed.   Amid the 
increase in crime and resentment from native Houstonians, city officials and agency advocates 
remain firmly in saying, that not all evacuees were the cause of trouble and created problems, 
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however the fact remains several gang leaders from New Orleans moved to Houston after the 
hurricane. (The Associated Press NYT 2007)  
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Conclusion 
The great city of New Orleans has a historical importance within American History. The city 
built from the hands of diverse cultures, has suffered a great loss from land and cultural 
monuments. Reconstruction efforts for the “big easy” must present a system of combined team 
work and governmental assistance. Although, the city of New Orleans will never be the same 
after Katrina, the native people remain optimistic and are moving forward to reconstruct their 
lives, homes, business’s and city to the grandeur southern sanctuary they love.  
After hurricane Katrina there are several government policies and procedures that will require 
much needed restructuring. Hopefully the lesson taught from old rotted levees and outdated 
evacuation manuals; will force the city of New Orleans to make the necessary changes to better 
ensure the future of New Orleans. 
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~Appendix~ 
This section details charts representing numbers and percentages for New Orleans public and 
private services, before and after the devastating event of hurricane Katrina. In addition to the 
graphical data, I have enclosed pictures of two housing projects (Algiers and Calliope) within the 
wards that suffered the most damage due to hurricane Katrina. Note that all housing projects in 
New Orleans are scheduled for demolition. Day’s after the hurricane fencing was placed around 
the housing projects that were home to many of New Orleans low poverty residents. These 
resident shave now been permanently (evicted, eradicated, relocated?) 
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New Orleans Residents the year 2000 Living in Poverty
13,708
109,960
7,228
Blacks 35%
Whites 11%
Other 25%
 
Sources: 2000 Census Data; Bill Marsh The New York Times- September 2005 
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Blacks, 15,429
Blacks, 21,787
Whites, 5,030
Whites, 2,606
Other, 1,372
Other, 1,384
Blacks Whites Other
New Orleans Households in poverty in 2000 by Race: With 
Cars & Without Cars
Without Cars
With Cars
 
Sources: 2000 Census Data; Bill Marsh The New York Times- September 2005 
 
 
New Orleans
Before 
Hurricane 
Katrina
Operational 
Buses 100% 
 
Percent in city 
Homes with 
Gas Services 
100% 
Percent of city 
Public Libraries 
Open 100% 
 
Percent of Metro area 
Fully 
Operational 
Hotels 100% 
Percent of Metro area 
Restaurants 
Open 100% 
 
Percent of Metro area
Labor Force 
633,654 
 
Number in the Metro 
area
Unemployment 
Rate 5.8% 
 
Percent of Metro area
Public Schools 
Open 116 
 
Number of city 
Sources: The New York Time; Bruce Katz, Matt Fellows 2005 
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New Orleans As of 
December 2005
Unemployment Rate 
15.5% 
Percent of Metro area 
Operational Buses 10%
 
Percent of Metro City 
Fully Operational 
Hotels 46% 
Percent of Metro area 
Labor Force 465,801 
 
Number in the Metro area 
Homes with Gas 
Service 50% 
Percent of City 
Restaurants Open 30%
 
Percent of Metro area 
Public Schools Open 
1 
Number of city 
Public Libraries Open 
58% 
Percent of Metro area 
Sources: The New York Time; Bruce Katz, Matt Fellows 2005 
 
 
198,232
98,141
133,966
Households- Actively recieving mail in Orleans Parish 
Pre Katrina
1Year Later
2 Years Later
Pre Katrina 198,232
1Year Later 98,141
2 Years Later 133,966
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368
61 69
Buses operational in Orleans Parish
Pre Katrina
1 Year Later
2 Years Later
Pre Katrina 368
1 Year Later 61
2 Years Later 69
 
 
Sources: The New York Time; Amy Liu, 2007 
202,350
137,752 158,844
Labor Force in Orleans Parish 2007
Pre Katrina
1 Year Later
2 Years Later
Pre Katrina 202,350
1 Year Later 137,752
2 Years Later 158,844
 
 
Unemployment Rates in New Orleans Metro Area 2007 
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5.30%
4.50%
5.10%
Pre Katrina
1 Year Later
2 years Later
Pre Katrina 5.3%
1 Year Later 4.50%
2 years Later 5.10%
 
Sources: The New York Time; Amy Liu, 2007 
 
 
 
 
 
Air passenger traffic arriving/departing @ Louis Armstrong airport, June 2007 
869,156
580,539
638,261
Pre Katrina
1 Year Later
2 Years Later
Pre Katrina 869,156
1 Year Later 580,539
2 Years Later 638,261
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Libraries open in Orleans Parish 
 
13
8
9
Pre Katrina
1 Year Later
2 Years Later
Pre Katrina 13
1 Year Later 8
2 Years Later 9
 
 
Sources: The New York Time; Amy Liu, 2007 
 
Hospitals operational in Orleans Parish 
23
9
13
Pre Katrina
1 Year Later
2 Years Later
Pre Katrina 23
1 Year Later 9
2 Years Later 13
 
Public schools open in Orleans Parish 
40 
 
128
53
83
Pre Katrina
1 Year Later
2 Years Later
Pre Katrina 128
1 Year Later 53
2 Years Later 83
 
Sources: The New York Time; Amy Liu, 2007 
 
 
 
 
House prices- average sales in New Orleans metropolitan area 
$259,754
$239,096
$233,309
Pre Katrina
1 Year Later
2 Years Later
Pre Katrina $259,754
1 Year Later $239,096
2 Years Later $233,309
 
Fair market rent-two bedroom apartment in New Orleans metropolitan area 
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$676
$940 $978
Pre Katrina
1 Year Later
2 Years Later
Pre Katrina $676
1 Year Later $940
2 Years Later $978
 
Sources: The New York Time; Amy Liu, 2007 
 
 
 
 
Road Home application vs. closings 
98,812
134,234
180,424
177
15,255 40,130
1/15/2007
5/7/2007
8/6/2007
1/15/2007 98,812 177
5/7/2007 134,234 15,255
8/6/2007 180,424 40,130
Applications Closings
 
Sources: The New York Time; Amy Liu, 2007 
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